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State Liability
GIUSEPPE DARI-MATTIACCI,' NUNO GAROUPA* & FERNANDO GOMEZ-POMAR***
Abstract: Should states be liable towards individuals for failure to provide justice, good
roads, or timely administrative decisions? In this article, we show that state liability can
serve three different purposes, none of which implies that the state should be liable in
tort, unless other specific conditions are met. One purpose is to provide incentives for
state agencies and private individuals to act efficiently. Here, the effectiveness of liability
depends on the channelling of incentives down the chain of command to the acting state
employee. The second purpose of state liability is to remove incentives for private
parties, when these incentives are distorted, as when compensating for wrongful con-
viction. The third aim of state liability is to allow a higher level of the administration to
monitor the behaviour of a lower level. In this case, the judicial system and private
parties are means towards the end of generating information about wrongful behaviour
by public bodies and agencies. Within this framework, we discuss substantive and
procedural aspects of state liability in torts. We provide an economic argument for court
specialization in administrative law and explain why the different solutions around the
world could be appropriate under local determinants.
Resume: Les Etats devraient-ils tre tenus responsables envers les individus pour leurs
manquements a assurer une bonne justice, des voiries en bon etat, ou A rendre des
decisions administratives dans des delais raisonnables? Dans cet article il est demontre
que la responsabilite de l'Etat peut servir trois objectifs diff6rents, aucun d'entre eux
n'impliquant la responsabilite civile de l'Etat, excepte dans les cas oii certaines condi-
tions specifiques sont reunies. L'un des objectifs est d'inciter les institutions de l'Etat et
les individus a agir efficacement. Ici, une responsabilite effective depend de la canalisa-
tion des motivations le long de la chaine de prise de decisions jusqu'au fonctionnaire
charg6 d'agir. Le deuxieme objectif de la responsabilite de l'Etat est d'eliminer toute
incitation pour les personnes privees, lorsque leurs motivations sont perverties, comme
dans le cas de compensation pour erreur judiciaire. Le troisieme objectif de la respons-
abilite de l'Etat est de permettre a l'echelon superieur de l'administration de superviser
la conduite des echelons inferieurs. Dans ce cas, le systeme judiciaire et les parties
personnes privees constituent des outils d'information sur le comportement fautif des
institutions et services publics. Dans ce contexte, il est discuth les aspects materiels et
proceduraux de la responsabilit6 civile de l'Etat. Cet article fournit un argument
6conomique en faveur de cours et tribunaux sp6cialis6s en droit administratif et envisage
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la possibilite d'adapter les differentes solutions appliquies dans le monde A des facteurs
locaux.
Zusammenfassung: Sollten Staaten gegeniiber Personen daftir haftbar sein, dass sie es
versiumt haben, Justiz, gute Stral3en oder rechtzeitige verwaltungsrechtliche Entschei-
dungen bereitzustellen? In diesem Beitrag soll dargestellt werden, dass Staatshaftung
drei verschiedene Ziele verfolgen kann, wobei keiner dieser Ziele zum Inhalt hat, dass
der Staat haftbar sein solite, es sei denn, dass noch weiter Voraussetzungen vorliegen.
Ein Ziel ist staatlichen Beh6rden sowie privaten Personen einen Anreiz zu bieten, um
effektiv zu handeln. Die Effektivittit der Haftung ist hier abhlingig von der Kanalisierung
der Anreize his zum Ende der Handlungskette der Beamten. Das zweite Ziel der Staat-
shaftung ist der Abbau von Anreizen fur private Personen, wenn diese Anreize verzerrt
werden, wie bei der Entschiidigung fir falsche Verurteilung. Das dritte Ziel der Staat-
shaftung ist, um der h8heren Ebene der Verwaltung zu erm6glichen, die Handlungen
der unteren Verwaltungsebene zu uiberwachen. In diesem Fall werden die Gerichte sowie
die privaten Parteien Mittel zur Beendigung der Erzeugung von Informationen tiber
unerlaubte Handlung durch offentlich rechtliche Korperschaften sowie Beh6rde.
Im Rahmen dieses Systems werden die materiellen sowie auch verfahrensrechtlichen
Aspekte der Staatshaftung flr unerlaubte Handlungen dargestellt. Die Verfasser geben
Argumente ftir eine Spezialisierung des Gerichts im Verwaltungsrecht und erltutern,
warum die verschiedenen Lsungsansiitze, die weltweit zu finden sind, im Rahmen
6rtlicher Faktoren angemessen sein kdnnten.
1. Introduction: The Issues behind State Liability and Sovereign Immunity
The state can be a significant source of negative externalities, both through actions
of its employees, officials and agents and through the failure to act in a given way.
States have armies, police forces, and prosecutors who can produce harm by their
actions, as well as let harm happen by their omissions. States promote public works
and build and maintain public infrastructures of many kinds, and private individuals
can suffer physical and property harm as a consequence of both. States regulate, in
varying degrees, many if not most economic activities, and they can impose, or fail
to impose, regulatory measures that can result in economic losses for the indivi-
duals and firms undertaking the regulated activities. States can confiscate property
(real estate, productive assets, firms, or cash) for temporary or for permanent
purposes. Yet the observed legal treatment of the liabilities that may be attached
to those instances of harm widely differs from the ordinary rules of tort law.'
Our article discusses tort liability of public authorities. State liability for breach of contract is
beyond the scope of this article. See DANIEL R. FISCHEL & ALAN 0. SYKEs, 'State Liability for Breach of
Contract', American Law and Economics Review 1 (1999): 313 and ABRAHAM L. WICKELGREN,
'Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the State Get Special Treatment?', Journal of Law,
Economics & Organization 17 (2001): 12. There is also the possibility of state liability for other
actions that are not tortious in nature (economic policies, legislative changes, or regulatory controls
that raise costs for a particular industry, or even failure to legislate or bad laws), see ANTHONY Ocus,
'Do We Have a General Theory of Compensation?', Current Legal Problems (1984): 29. As to the
particular case of takings, see THomAS J. MICEu, Economics of the Law (New York: Oxford University
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The idea that external effects are a source of social loss and should therefore
be internalized is one of the most, not to say the most, common theme in the
economic analysis of law, which is mainly concerned with the identification of
efficient legal rules to achieve this goal. The Coasean tradition2 has better qualified
this endeavour by distinguishing between those situations that are characterized by
low transaction costs, in which internalization of external effects occurs through
voluntary agreements, and those in which transaction costs are high and where
some legal intervention may be necessary. In the latter case, Gary Becker3 and
Guido Calabresi 4 have laid the foundations for the analysis of the two most wide-
spread, historically and currently, legal devices employed to internalize external-
ities, namely, criminal law and tort law.
These two bodies of law are mainly concerned with providing incentives for
individuals and firms not to impose harm on others. From here, the step towards
advocating tort liability for public organizations such as states, regulatory agencies,
local state branches, the police, or the judiciary is relatively short. In this article, we
examine the incentive effects of state liability and show that they can be classified in
three main categories: the provision of incentives for the state or for private parties
to act properly in the service of socially desirable goals, the removal of incentives for
private parties to engage in socially detrimental behaviour when those incentives
are distorted, and the generation of information about wrongful behaviour by public
agencies.
To illustrate, state liability for failure to maintain roads in adequate condi-
tions for safe driving would fit a traditional internalization argument as follows: If
the state (at the relevant level, depending on the administrative responsibility over
the road) is liable for failure to maintain public roads, the prospect of paying
damages can be regarded as providing incentives to the organization so that state
employees, at the different levels of authority, choose the optimal level of main-
tenance expenditures. It would operate, thus, in just the same way as a firm's
vicarious liability makes its employees internalize the harm to victims and hence
choose the adequate levels of care in undertaking potentially harmful activities.5
Press, 1997), Ch. 7. Finally, we do not look at primary and secondary remedies for tort liability
through administrative law.
2 RONALD H. COASE, 'The Problem of Social Cost', Journal ofLaw & Economics 3 (1960): 1.
GARY S. BECKER, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal ofPolitical Economy 76
(1968): 169.
4 GUIDO CALABRESI, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970).
See ALAN 0. SYKEs, 'An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability under the Law of Agency', Yale
Law Journal 91 (1981): 168; ALAN 0. SYKEs, 'The Economics of Vicarious Liability', Yale Law
Journal 93 (1984): 1231; ALAN 0. SYKEs, 'An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Doctrines', Harvard Law Review 101 (1988): 563. The monetary incentive that
liability towards victims places on the residual claimants of the liable organization (shareholders,
in the case of a private firm) runs down the organizational chain and reaches the relevant decision-
makers who can take measures to reduce the external risk only if, despite the unavoidable agency
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In this case, state liability is supposed to produce good incentives for the state
organs, bodies and officials. Another important example could refer to the provision
of accurate information (such as weather forecasts6 ) that significantly reduces
individual search costs.
As to cases for removal of incentives, they include situations such as those in
which a corrupt official refuses to issue a permit to an honest entrepreneur unless
the latter pays a bribe to the former. In this case, the idea is not that state liability
will produce incentives for public officials, but rather that letting the victim of the
abuse rely on damage compensation paid by the state makes it less likely that he or
she will feel inclined or compelled to bribe a public official. In this case, liability is
supposed to remove incentives for private parties to engage in activities that corrupt
state officials.
Most commonly, state liability has incentive effects both on the agency and
on private individuals. However, while individual incentives usually reach those
private individuals directly, incentives for state agencies are vulnerable to a funda-
mental failure in the chain of command; that is, making the public organization
liable may fail to provide its employees with incentives to act efficiently, for the
sanction imposed on the organization might not reach the responsible individuals.
Absent sufficient incentives for individual officials, liability will not improve the
actions taken by those who compose the public organization. The question whether
incentives are transferred from the organization to its agents is not specific to state
liability and is not novel in law and economics. An analogous issue arises when firms
are vicariously liable for misconduct of their agents8 and is a manifestation of the
costs, it is possible for the organization to design and implement internal incentive mechanisms
inclining the employees to improve their behaviour concerning accidents. The same would be true
of the state and public organizations. See LARRY KRAMER & ALAN 0. SvKEs, 'Municipal Liability under
§1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis', Supreme Court Review 6 (1987): 249, 275, arguing that
the incentive problem of private and public organizations is, in its economic essence, the same and
is thus amenable to the same kind of analysis. In turn, Eiuc A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, 'An
Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under International Law', American
Law & Economics Review 9 (2007): 72, 81, argue that monitoring ability - ability of principals to
induce agents to take greater precautions against harm - is the crucial factor affecting the desir-
ability of the vicarious form of liability, be it of private firms or of governments.
6 See discussion by RONALD B. STANDLER, 'Tort Liability in the US for Negligent Weather Forecasts',
<www.rbs2.com/forecast.pdf>, 13 Aug. 2003.
7 The issue of whether or not the corrupt employee should be personally liable in this case is a
problem that we do not discuss as it is beyond the scope of this article.
8 See SYKES, supra n. 5; KRAMER & SYKEs, supra n. 5; and POSNER & SYKEs, supra 5; See also LEWIS A.
KoRNHAUSER, 'An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and Personal Liability for
Accidents', California Law Review 70 (1982): 1345; JENNIFER H. ARLEN, 'The Potentially Perverse
Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability', Journal ofLegal Studies 23 (1994): 832; CYRUs C.Y. Cu &
YINGY[ QLAN, 'Vicarious Liability under a Negligence Rule', International Review ofLaw & Econom-
ics 15 (1995): 305; NuNo GAROUPA, 'Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives:
A Managerial Perspective', Managerial and Decision Economics 21 (2000): 243; GIUSEPPE DARI-
MArrlAccI & FRANcEsco PARISI, 'The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, Secondary
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well-known agency problem between organizations and their subordinates.9 Public
administrations that have fairly inflexible regimes of salaries and internal promo-
tions (e.g., seniority prevails as the major factor for promotion) do not allow free
renegotiation or readjustment in case of liability arising from the agent's actions.
Public administrators can lose their jobs following a criminal conviction for parti-
cular crimes, and this scheme could be (though we have no evidence that it
commonly is) extended to tort judgments based on a finding of negligence. Never-
theless, the problem remains in areas of strict tort liability, where a finding of
negligence on the part of the administration is not necessary for the establishment
of the agency's liability and hence the dismissal of the (potentially non-negligent)
responsible official could be both legally unsound and economically inefficient in
most cases.10 Moreover, even a reduction in the nominal salary as a consequence of
causing an accident or misbehaviour might not be allowed. Due to such obstacles in
the way of channelling responsibility through the employment contract, criminal
law remains the main source of incentives for state officials, corruption being the
most obvious example. However, criminal sanctions require lengthy and expensive
proceedings and are likely to target only major violations, thus resulting in under-
deterrence of misbehaviour by state officials.
Another serious problem posed by state liability is how organizations could
structure themselves or respond in order to avoid liability. There are four important
aspects. First, the likelihood that, within the state organization, effort may be made
in order to cover-up misbehaviour or negligent behaviour by state officials, even the
mere occurrence of accidents and harm if strict liability is imposed." Second, the
build-up of a group of extremely expensive internal and external staff of legal
councillors to argue the case for the state (here with potential conflicts of interest
with state prosecutors who might represent the victims). Third, serious adverse
selection with respect to hiring personnel and moral hazard across state depart-
ments depending on different degrees of exposure to state liability may arise.
Fourth, liability may encourage timidity and abstention from action on the part of
Liability and Mandatory Insurance', International Review of Law & Economics 23 (2003): 453;
JENNIFER ARLEN & W. BENTLEY MACLEOD, 'Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vicarious Liability',
in Exploring Tort Law, ed. STUART MADDEN (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
9 See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & HAROLD DEMSEYZ, 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organiza-
tion', American Economics Review 62 (1972): 777.
10 See KRAMER & SYKs, supra n. 5, for argument in favour of individual immunity of the public
employee In cases in which the harm - constitutional tort, more specifically - is not the product of
wilful or grossly negligent behaviour.
1 This case is similar to the problem discussed by ARLEN, supra n. 8; CHU & QLAN, supra n. 8; and
ARLEN & MACLEOD, supra n. 8: when the employer can actively supervise and control behaviour of
the employees, this could speak in favour of the efficiency of vicarious liability in the circumstances.
However, given that supervision and control can provide evidence against the employer at trial, the
employer also has incentives to curtail monitoring or to destroy evidence.
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the government (unless liability for omissions and over-precaution are imposed, a
very unlikely situation) in order to reduce the liability bill. There is an argument of
inaction and excessive caution as the necessary price to pay for liability. Compensa-
tion of victims of public conduct is a common argument in defence of immunity
applied to personal liability of the individual public employee 12 (of which more
later). Nevertheless, it may well be relevant to the liability of the organization as
such, given that some of the decisions of government action are taken at the higher
echelons of the governmental organization, who may be concerned with the budget-
ary effects of liability payments from state action.' 3
The commonly made argument that public officials may be shielded from
incentives, or that otherwise individuals acting on behalf of the state do not face
effective mechanisms that penalize them for causing harm, thus making state
liability ineffective, is not the whole story. We demonstrate, in fact, that the
problem is more serious than that. Imposing liability on the state may not simply
fail to improve incentives; it may even dilute them. If the aim is the reduction of
accidents, the traditional sceptic would go so far as to say that state liability will, in
the worst case, leave the number of accidents unvaried. We argue instead that
accidents may increase because, while failing to improve the incentives of the state
officials and employees, state liability may well weaken the incentives of private
parties, who can now rely on state compensation of their losses. State liability ends
up functioning as a taxpayer-funded accident insurance, which will obviously create
a substantial moral hazard problem on the part of those who can benefit from this
implicit coverage. We show that a contributory negligence defence better counters
these problems than other liability arrangements.
Moreover, if state liability fails to provide incentives in general we are to
expect the state to be found negligent in state liability cases. Thus, the likely
outcome is either one in which both parties are negligent (but the victim effectively
bears only a negligible part of the loss, or he or she would have been induced to
behave non-negligently) or one in which only the state is negligent (and the victim
bears no loss). Eventually, when incentives fail, the residual accident costs fall on
the state with the consequent aggravation of budget constraints and the contraction
of some state activities, albeit not necessarily the accident-producing activity in
question. The latter statement may be understood with reference to the premise: if
incentives fail with respect to care, it is difficult to see why they should succeed with
respect to the level of activity.
Beyond the assessment of the conditions in which the state liability regime
should be crafted and applied, there is a very important issue hitherto unmentioned.
12 See JEFFREY MASHAW, 'Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Account-
ability', Law & Contemporary Problems 42 (1978): 8, 26; PETER SCHUCK, 'Suing Our Servants:
The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages', Supreme Court Review
1980 (1980): 281.
See KRAMER & SYKES, supra n. 5.
778
The government is no single body but a conglomerate of entities and organizations
enjoying a greater or lesser extent of public power. The state is not one and single-
dimensional but a multidimensional and multibranch kind of organization. In a
multilevel organization, state liability can have the function to police lower levels,
or at least viewed as a mechanism to generate information about their performance.
For example, the central government could place liability on a regional or provin-
cial government or on the court system. In this case, effective monitoring depends
on the operation of courts and on the decisions and actions of private individuals in
terms of bringing suit against the state. These lawsuits convey information to the
central government about the activities of these bodies. The waiver of sovereign
immunity as a monitoring strategy does not go without costs, namely the costs of
state liability borne by the central government. The relevant question is if using
state liability as a form of monitoring strategy is the most efficient alternative given
the problems we have identified.
Any state liability regime presupposes the state as a defendant. Given the
specificities of the state as a defendant, it has been argued that a special legal
framework, namely specialized courts and judges, specific or distinct procedural
rules and a different regime for out-of-court settlements, should govern the liability
of the state. Although the general reasoning behind our analysis relates to admin-
istrative law in the broad sense, our discussion focuses on the specific question of
recognizing a special status to the state as a defendant. We cannot separate the state
defendant in tort from other state functions and roles, and hence it is possible that a
special legal framework makes sense in some jurisdictions but not in other jurisdic-
tions, depending on the institutional environment.
Our analysis is carried out in this article from a welfare perspective, and we
ask three fundamental questions: (i) whether or not state liability advances social
welfare; (ii) if state liability advances social welfare, how should state liability be
designed; and (iii) how should state liability be enforced.
In the following sections, we will make the point that an optimal design of
state liability depends on a clear conceptual separation between the three distinct
goals for which liability may be advocated: the production of positive incentives,
the removal of negative incentives and the control of lower levels of government.
In section 2, we will present state liability from a comparative and historical
perspective and discuss existing theories concerning state liability, in the light of
the fact that comparativists have identified state liability as a major difference
across legal systems.14 Section 3 provides an economic interpretation of the three
distinct functions of state liability. In section 4, we will discuss the desirability of a
specializcd cgal frame-work for state liability. Some final remarks will be made in
section 5.
4 See BAsL MAussNu, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Classroom: The Story of the Last
Thirty-Five Years (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003), 189.
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2. State Liability from a Comparative and Historical Perspective
2. 1 The Liability of the State and Sovereign Immunity
Historically, states have enjoyed almost unlimited immunity against the legal claims
for redress in tort by individuals. Both in the common law and the civil law
traditions, the starting point has been that of sovereign immunity. Maxims such
as The King can do no wrong or Le Roi ne peut mal faire reflect more or less
accurately the common wisdom on the prevailing legal treatment of harm suffered
by citizens as a result of state actions or failure to act. From the nineteenth century
onwards, and especially in the twentieth century, the rule of absolute immunity has
experienced significant erosion. In English law, for example, the Crown Proceed-
ings Act of 1947 determines that the Crown is equated with a private person of full
age and capacity in respect of liability for tort, although some exceptions in favour
of the police and certain statutory corporations were kept.
The American history of state liability in tort, somewhat surprisingly, reflects
the evolution from the unqualified and almost unquestioned reception of a common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity, containing a strong flavour of the feudal
privilege of the Lord over his vassals, to an apparent statutory basis for immunity,' 5
although with some important waivers, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946
and other state statutes along similar lines.' 6 The American legal tradition on state
liability has been largely sceptical of imposing liability on the state, pointing at the
uncertainty of its consequences, but also at the inconsistency of allowing the
exercise of legal rights against the same authority (the government) that makes
the law on which these rights depend.17
The two concurring views were expressed in the well-known case of
Dalehite v. US (1953).'8 While the majority of the Court took the view that the
Federal Tort Claims Act did not create broad state liability (alien to the common
1s Under common law, the state is traditionally immune from liability for damages without its consent.
Most state constitutions in the United States impose restrictions on suits against the state. There-
fore, a court cannot hear a case asking it to force the state to pay damages absent legislative
authorization for payment; the remedy is itself unconstitutional. In addition, the Eleventh Amend-
ment protects states (but not the federal government since this one has immunity in common law)
from liability in reaction to the 1793 decision by the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419 (1793). With respect to constitutional torts in particular, the immunity doctrines have been
devised by the Supreme Court. See LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL, 'A Theory of Government Damages
Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings', University of Pennsylvania Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 9 (2007): 797, fns 13, 14, and 83.
16 HELENE GOLDBERG, 'Tort Liability for Federal Government Actions in the United States: An Over-
view', in Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, ed. DUNCAN FAIRCRIEVE,
MADS ANDENAS & JOHN BELL (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003),
521; ROSENTHAL, supra n. 15, 799.
17 PAUL F. FICLEY & JAY TIDMARSH, 'The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity', Michigan Law
Review 107 (2009): 1207.
18 This was an action to recover damages for death under the Federal Tort Claims Act 1946.
A disastrous explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer under the control of the federal government
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law) by concluding that the government benefits from an exception of discretionary
function, the dissenting minority argued that since the disaster was caused by
actions completely controlled by the government, tort liability should be imposed
on the government. The dissenting minority also expressed the view that the
adoption of the government's exception of discretionary doctrine would undermine
the incentives for official responsibility in certain risky activities.' 9 Largely speak-
ing, the view of the majority has prevailed so far.2 o
In Europe, the English regime should be classified from the outset as one
apparently not joining the major European trend in modern times of generously
favouring state liability, at least in theory.21 Moreover, the English legal regime is
the only one where the question of public immunity in general can be posed as a
relevant legal problem. English courts repeatedly applied striking out procedures,
refusing even to admit that public authorities were subject to a duty of care mainly
based on policy concerns.22 Recently, this perspective has been revisited and the
on 16 and 17 Apr. 1947 killed more than 500 people and wiped out an entire city (Texas City,
Texas).
19 The majority of the Court rejected liability on any decision at any high level of the administration.
The current scope of the federal government's immunity is essentially the same that governs the
states and has not changed: see Department oftheArmy v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (1999) and
West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999). In fact, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) argue
that the Supreme Court has expanded state immunity and effectively constrained congressional
authority to develop state liability in the last decade or so.
20 See, among others, HAROLD J. KRENT, 'Preserving Discretion without Sacrifice Deterrence: Federal
Governmental Liability in Tort', UCLA Law Review 38 (1991): 871; BARRY R. GOLDMAN, 'Can the
King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act', Georgia Law Review 26 (1992): 837; WuAM P. KairzKE, 'The Supreme Court's
Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act', Admin-
istrative Law Journal of American University 7 (1993): 1.
21 Agreeing and claiming that 'policy reasons' are used as independent grounds to restrict public
liability, see RALPH-ANDREAS SURMA, 'A Comparative Study of the English and German Judicial
Approach to the Liability of Public Bodies in Negligence', in Tort Liability of Public Authorities
in Comparative Perspective, ed. DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, MADS ANDENAS & JOHN BELL (London: British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2002). See also CAROL HARLow, State Liability: Tort
Law and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), who takes a corrective justice perspec-
tive. For an economic approach, see OGUs, supra n. 1.
22 A comparative view of state liability in English law is provided by RAYMOND YOUNGs, English, French
and German Comparative Law, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2007), Ch. 5. According to this
author, the basis for state liability is narrow following R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex
p Factortame Ltd and Others (1996). The immunity was abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act
1947, but there is a defence in statutory authority. According to this defence, if the action was the
inevitable consequence of the acts authorized, the defendant is not negligent following Tate &
Lyle v. GLC (1983). Furthermore, there is no right of action if the nuisance is inevitable. See also
for a discussion of the current situation in English law, DUNCAN FAIRCRIEVE, 'Pushing Back the
Boundaries of Public Authority Liability', in Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative
Perspective, ed. DuNcAN FmRGIlEvE, MADs ANDENAS & JOHN BELL (London: British Institute of
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emphasis is now more often put on the definition of the duty of care or on the level
of due care, and not on its existence (therefore confirming a more favourable view
of individuals' rights against public bodies).
Legal systems in continental Europe were very much influenced by the
French experience. 24 The French Law of 1790 stated clearly that judges cannot
and shall not interfere with the administration. Such rule in practice created an
effective immunity from judicial review for administrative acts that was not neces-
sarily intended by the 1790 legislators. Historically, it is not clear why that was so.
Whatever the reasons, the fact is that the administration was placed outside of
judicial review in the package of the Napoleonic transformation of the legal systems
of the Ancien Rdgime (a package also including the codification of civil, commercial,
criminal, and procedural laws) across Europe, with the specific purpose of prevent-
ing judges from interfering with the running of the new, reform-inspired state
administrations. 26 An obvious consequence is that state liability could not be
developed until much later. Most legal systems initially made use of different means
to ensure some compensation for wrongs imposed by public bodies on the life, limb
and property of citizens: legal fictions, such as the nomination of an individual
International and Comparative Law, 2003), 475; DUNCAN FAIRcRiEVE, State Liability in Tort.
A Comparative Law Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Ch. 4.
23 The UK Law Commission has also expressed the need to develop a more pro compensation attitude
regarding public liability. In recent document, titled 'Remedies against Public Bodies',
<www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/remedies-scoping-report.pdf>, 2006, the Law Commission (consider-
ing particularly the judicial review mechanism) explicitly claims that 'This report sets out our plans
for a substantive law reform project on the remedies available to the individual against public
bodies'. The Commission's major thesis is that the right to compensation still depends on judicial
discretion no matter the Human Rights Act (1998), the EU, and the developments in governmental
liability in tort.
24 For French Law, see BASIL MARKESINIs, 'Unity of Division: The Search for Similarities in Contem-
porary European Law', in Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, ed.
DUNCAN FAIRRIEVE, MADs ANDENAS & JOHN BELL (London: British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 2003), 451; JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BYRON & SIMON WHYTrAKER, Principles of French
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22.
2s Explanations include a conflictive interpretation or misinterpretation of the separation of powers
throughout those years that go from the 1789 Revolution to the Napoleonic codes that formally
established a differentiation between judicial and administrative powers in rulemaking. Other
authors refer to the general feeling among French policy makers that customary law - French
common law - was a significant nuisance for the administration because it allowed judges to be
lawmakers and interfere excessively with the administration from the viewpoint of the bureaucrats.
Others mention quite unconvincingly pure historical path dependence. See PAULO C. RANGEL,
Repensar o Poder Judicia, Fundamentos e Fragmentos (Porto: Universidade Cat6lica Tema,
2001) [in Portuguese], Ch. 3 and MICHAEL TROPER, La Siparation des Pouvoirs et I'Histoire Con-
stitutionnelle Franaise (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980) [in French].
26 See BENITO AaRUlADA & VENErA ANDONOVA, 'Judges' Cognition and Market Order', Review of Law
and Economics 4 (2008), who emphasize how the most famous portion of the Napoleonic legal
package, namely codification, was an effort to restrain the power of judges (presumably in favour of
the Ancien Regime) against the reforms developed by revolutionary legislatures and administrations.
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official as defendant, standing the state financially behind him; specific legislation
imposing liability in areas such as public works, or local public services, and courts
decision crafting exceptions to the general rule of immunity.2 7 The erosion of state
immunity advanced notably over time. A broad principle of state liability became
enshrined in several European constitutional provisions, as embodying an important
ingredient of the Rule of Law (Rechtstaat, Estado de Derecho, Stato di Diritto).
The broad legal-philosophical principle that government activity is to be carried out
under the Law inspires Articles 24 and 28 of the Italian Constitution (1948),
Article 34 of the German Constitution (1949) and Article 106.3 of the Spanish
Constitution (1978).
Although there is definitely a general trend in Continental Europe towards a
more generous state liability, this has been essentially advanced by means of case
law almost inasmuch as in England. However, whereas in France case law created an
independent body of rules for state liability (independent from private law rules of
liability), in England courts have applied ordinary tort rules to government liability
(the most developed category being negligence) and only one specific public law
tort, misfeasance in public office, is consistently applied. France is said to have a
liberal legal system towards state liability,28 especially due to the fact that French
courts very early recognized a claimant right to damages for losses caused by central
authorities (Blanco 1873)29 and later extended this principle to local authorities
(Feutry 19083o).3 1 Nowadays, the French legal system has to cope with an excessive
number of claims and with the trend towards the replacement of faute lourde by
faute simple in the areas of health care, emergency services,3 3 and regulatory
activities with a consequent further expansion of litigation.34
27 For a summary of the historical evolution of state liability both in common law and civil law
countries, see H. STREET, Governmental Liability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953),
Ch. 1; FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22, Ch. 2.
28 As FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22, 17, aptly puts it: 'French Law is based upon the general principal that a
claimant may gain damages for the fault of a public body which has caused loss'.
29 TC 8 Feb. 18 73, Blanco Case, D. 18 73.3.17.
30 TC 29 Feb. 1908, Featry, D. 1908.3.4914.
31 See the summary by YouNcs, supra n. 22. Faute de service (fault within the scope of duty) is dealt by
administrative courts applying special liability rules different from those in the Code Civil applied
tofautepersonelle (personal fault). They must be too serious to be regarded outside of the scope of
duty or committed for intentional harm; it is generally easier to establish liability of public bodies;
the state can be liable for malfunctioning of its judicial system in case of grave fault or denial of
justice (developed by case law of the Conseil d'Etat).
32 Change arose with the Conseil d'Etat decision in CE Ass. 10 avril 1992, M. et Mme. V. See AusoN
PADFIELD, 'French Medical Negligence: Change in the Standard of Skill and Care Required', Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (1993): 906.
3 See PIERRE LAURENT FRIER & JACQUEs PETIT, Pricis de DroitAdministratif, 4th edn (Paris: Montchres-
tien, 2006), 481 [in French]. The authors equate whether faute lourde is about to be fully
abandoned in all policy matters.
34 See for a description of this trend towards faute simple, FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22, 118. See also
FRIER & Prrr, supra n. 33, 480-481.
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In Italy, state liability has faced important developments in recent years also due
to a major court decision of the Court of Cassation.35 A second substantial step
towards a more generous state liability was made with a new law,36 concerning a
reform of administrative law and procedure. This law attributed the competence to
award damages to administrative courts, reflecting the decision to attribute to admin-
istrative judges all matters of public administration civil liability (for juridical and
non-juridical acts). This law overruled the above-quoted landmark decision in the
part where it allowed civil courts to declare the unlawfulness of administrative
decisions; thereby, this prerogative is attributed exclusively to administrative courts.
However, it is Spain that favours the most state liability, having chosen a
broad, no-fault state liability regime. Fault is formally only important at most to
determine the amount of damages. The situation in Spain has reached such a point
that some legal commentators speak now of 'overcompensation' or a practical
'social insurance' system established under the veil of state liability.37 Another
distinctive feature of the Spanish state liability system resides in the fact that the
main impulse for the implementation of the current state liability system resulted
from a synergy between the legislator and academic commentators rather than from
court decisions.38
These developments have not eliminated, however, the special status of the
state and public bodies within the domain of liability for harm caused, nor the
3s The decision from the Cassazione Sezioni Unite, no 500 from 22 Jul. 1999 performed a judicial
novelty: it finally adopted the thesis of the reparability of harm (with interessi legitimi) caused by the
state and public authorities to private parties. The previous situation of Italian law is summarized by
THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, The Italian Legal Tradition (Sudbury, MA- Dartmouth Publishing Company,
1997). Administrative courts were solely concerned with the legality of administrative measures
(incompetence, excess of power, or violation of the law).
36 Legge 21 Luglio 2000 no 205 and, very recently, Decreto Legislativo del 2 Luglio 2010 no 104. See,
for detailed references to the Italian case, ROBERTO CARANTA, Attivita Amministrativa ed Ilecito
Aquiliano: La Responsabilita della P.A. dopo la L. 21 Luglio 2000, N 205 (Milano: Giuffre, 2001)
[in Italian].
3 See OmOL MIR PUIGPELAT, La Responsabilidad Patrimonial de la Adminisracin. Hacia un Nuevo
Sistema (Madrid: Civitas, 2002) [in Spanish]. Others are less convinced that this stage has been
actually reached in the concrete operation of state liability by Spanish courts: FERNANDO GOMEZ &
ViCTOR SANCHEz, El Problema de la Responsabilidad de las Administraciones Publicas en Derecho
Espafiol: La V4oin del Andlisis Economico del Derecho, 34 Sub Judice, Parte II 27 (2006) [in
Spanish]. See also discussion by TERESA RODRIGUEZ DE LAS HERAs BALLELL, Introduction to Spanish
Private Law (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010), explaining state liability in Spain is subject to
a so-called universal system since anyone injured in the provision of public services can claim
damages and because there is direct liability of the state even if the public employee who caused the
wrongdoing has not been identified. Furthermore, she argues that strict liability prevails since only
force majeure is admissible as defence.
38 See discussion by ANToNIo LAZAu, Modelli e Paradigmi della Responsabilia dello Stato (Torino:
G. Giappichelli, 2005), 178-182 [in Italian]. For Spanish law, EDuAR.DO GARCIA DE ENTERRiA &
ToMAS-RAMON FERNANDEZ, Curso de Derecho Administrativo, 8th edn (Madrid: Civitas, 2003), 358
[in Spanish].
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differences between different legal traditions with respect to the grounds, scope and
purpose of state liability. English law remains comparatively restrictive in the
European context, providing for relatively ample space for individual liability by
public officials - to which vicarious liability of the public body may also attach - and
to broad exceptions to state liability established by courts on policy grounds. At the
other extreme, Southern European legal systems such as France, Italy and Spain, on
the one hand, proclaim very generous and indiscriminate principles of state liability
in tort and, on the other hand, tend strongly and extensively to insulate their public
officials and bureaucrats from individual liability, except in the most serious cases
of personal misconduct and when criminal liability arises. It is true, nevertheless,
that courts in those systems, even under the rule of an expansive regime of state
liability and even without challenging the basic policy choices underlying this
system, find numerous opportunities to make use of general doctrines in tort
law - proximate causation, assumption of risk, equitable duty to suffer harm - to
restrict the scope of state liability. Moreover, in these systems, we find specialized
administrative courts deciding cases of state liability, which, one may think, may be
more favourable to the legal arguments and the interests of the state than courts of
general jurisdiction.3 9 German law would probably lie somewhat in between the
English and the Latin systems of state liability, where the civil code contemplates
official liability (Article 839 Biurgerlichen Gesetzbuches (BGB) but the Constitution
effectively transfers the liability of the official to the public authority (Article 34
the German Constitution (GG), as we have seen).40 Still, German state liability has
also advanced by means of case law by restricting the application of legal statutes
limiting public liability. This positive trend is seen by German legal doctrine as still
insufficient and roots itself in the need to protect the individual from 'public
powers'.4
3 For instance, as illustrative real-world evidence of this potentially different attitude of general and
specialized courts, we have conducted a simple descriptive study of the sample of 2006 cases in the
Spanish Supreme Court. In our study, in ordinary tort cases decided by the Civil Chamber, the
plaintiff prevailed in 69% of the decisions. In state liability cases, the plaintiff prevailed over public
bodies as defendant only in 35% of the liability cases decided by the Administrative Chamber.
Although many factors may be at play and therefore we should be quite careful making inferences
from the probability of success at trial, the discrepancy is large enough to allow us to think that
divergent attitudes may be influencing the outcome of this kind of litigation.
40 See discussion by YOUNGs, supra n. 22, Ch. 5, and MICHAEL NIERHAus, 'Administrative Law', in
Introduction to German Law, 2nd edn, ed. J. ZEKOLL & M. REMANN (The Hague: Kluwer, 2005).
State liability constitutes a special area of administrative law, largely uncodified and different from
Lthe1ight forcopeion from government expropriation (Art. A14III GG).
41 See F. OSSENBOHL, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th edn (Munich: CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen,
1998), 6 [in German]. For German law, see GERT BRUGGEMELER, 'From Individual Tort for Civil
Servants to Quasi-strict Liability of the State: Governmental or State Liability in Germany', in Tort
Liability ofPublic Authorities in Comparative Perspective, ed. DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, MADS ANDENAS &
JOHN BELL (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003), 571; SuRMA,
supra n. 21, 355.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, state liability has also attracted considerable atten-
tion by the European Union.42 At the European Union level, the question is no
longer whether or not there is a state liability regime but its scope of protection and
the chosen legal instruments to operate it. The role of the High Courts of Europe in
promoting generous state liability contrasts with the trend in the United States.
In particular, the difficult distinction between actions of the state in a public
capacity and in a private capacity that varies across countries has been forced to
conform with the European standard set by Francovich.44
The reality of legal systems shows that personal liability of the individual
public employee is a rare occurrence, except for the most egregious cases of
personal misconduct individually ascertainable. Even in those jurisdictions, such
as England, in which the vicarious liability paradigm continues to provide the broad
legal basis for state liability, most public employees are practically shielded from
liability either through statutory immunity - common in civil law systems - or
through indemnity provisions in their favour. 46 In the United States, in response to
a Supreme Court decision restricting immunity, the Westfall Act of 1988 restored
absolute immunity of federal employees for torts committed in the course of their
employment, and many states also offer similar levels of statutory immunity to their
employees.47
State liability in Chinese law is complex.4 8 Under the 1982 Constitution,
state liability was revived and the present rules and regulations concerning state
liability are embodied by the State Compensation Law enacted in 1994. Largely
42 A European Recommendation on the subject was enacted in 1985 (Recommendation No. R (84) 15
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States relating to Public Liability), whose first principle
reads 'Reparation should be ensured for damage caused by an act due to a failure of a public
authority to conduct itself in a way which can reasonably be expected from it in law in relation to the
injured person'. Such a failure is presumed in cases of transgression of an established legal rule.
Moreover, this Recommendation could also be regarded as a first mature European sign of concern
regarding the expansion of public authorities' activity and potential damages caused.
43 See, among others, JAMES PFANDER, 'Member State Liability and Constitutional Change in the United
States and Europe', American Journal of Comparative Law 51 (2003); JAMES PFANDER, 'K6bler v.
Austria: Expositional Supremacy and Member State Liability', European Business Law Review 17
(2006): 275; and DANIEL J. MELTZER, 'Member State Liability in Europe and the United States',
International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2006): 39.
4 See YouNcs, supra n. 22, Ch. 5.
45 See, for example, Art. 145, Spanish Ley 30/1992, de Regimen Juridico de las Administraciones
Publicas, y del Procedimiento Administrativo Comuin.
46 FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22, 25-26.
47 GOLDBERG, supra n. 16, 527; RosENTHAL, supra n. 15, 813.
48 For example, Hong Kong has been influenced by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. Hong Kong
passed its own Crown Proceedings Ordinance in 1957. Macao developed the principle of state
liability stipulated by the 1976 Portuguese Constitution into law in 1991, under Decree Law 28/91.
Art. 2 of this decree reads that 'the administration, collective public bodies and agents shall be
liable for the illegal acts during public management'. The State Compensation Law of Republic of
China (Taiwan) (SCL) was promulgated in 1980, with the Enforcement Rules for State
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speaking, in China, state liability is dominated by government, and only marginally
with court intervention. According to Chinese law, the state body under compensa-
tory obligation shall instruct its personnel or the entrusted organization or person
who has committed intentional or grave mistake to bear part or all the expenses for
damage. Besides, the individual public employee could also undertake administra-
tive or criminal liability (under Article 24 of the State Compensation Law).
The statistics show that there is a significant number of cases concerning state
liability in China, in particular wrongdoings by public prosecutors, confirming the
general impression that Chinese authorities use the State Compensation Law to
monitor public employees and to make sure they act in a lawful way.49
Using state liability primarily to monitor public employees seems common in
Asian jurisdictions. In Japan, state liability is established by the 1946 Constitution
(Article 17) and addressed by the 1947 Law on Compensation by the State (which
greatly expands tort liability for the public administration).5 0 Ever since the abol-
ishment of the administrative courts, all state liability cases are adjudicated in
ordinary courts. However, the characteristics of public laws are still preserved in
actions against the government or its agencies. 5 1 The reforms operated in the 1990s
seem to rely on the monitoring of state employees by the public in general. In the
case of Korea, state liability is regulated by the 1951 State Compensation Law
(revised in 1967 and amended six times since then). This law regulates tortious
conduct by public employees while performing official duties. Vietnam has passed
in 2009 their Law on State's Liability to Pay Compensation while state liability is
regulated in Thailand by two laws, the 1996 Act on Government Administrative
Compensation Law being promulgated in 1981. The SCL as well as its enforcement rules were based
on Art. 24 of the Constitution of Taiwan.
4 KEITH HAND, 'Watching the Watchdog: China's State Compensation Law as a Remedy for Prosecu-
torial Misconduct', Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 9 (2000): 95.
50 In particular, the state is now liable for harms negligently or intentionally committed by public
employees even though those employees are engaged in an 'exercise of the public authority', a
condition that previously permitted the state to avoid most liability in tort. Of course, there is still
debate as to exactly what is an 'exercise of the public authority'. See, for example, Sawarabi
Kabashike, Kaisha v. City of Kyoto, 691 Hanrei Jiho 57 (Kyoto Dist. Ct. 1972). Moreover, large
areas of discretion and partial immunity still exist. Nevertheless, most demands for pecuniary relief
against the state are made under the Law on Compensation by the State. See discussion by HiRosHI
ODA, Japanese Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 195.
51 That is, special procedures must be applied in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act
promulgated in 1993. Before, litigation against the state was regulated by the Administrative Case
Litigation Act (amended in 2004 loosening the standing requirement) and the Administrative
Complains Investigation Act, both enacted in 1962. Se KATsumA U-, 'Development ofthe Con-
cepts of Transparency and Accountability in Japanese Administrative Law', in Law in Japan:
A Turning Point, ed. DANIEL H. FOOTE (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007) and CARL
F. GOODMAN, The Rule of Law in Japan (The Hague: Kluwer, 2008), 463 ff.
52 See discussion by Tom GINSBuRG, 'The Politics of Transparency in Japanese Administrative Law', in
Law in Japan: A Turning Point, ed. DANIEL H. FOOTE (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2007).
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Practices and the 1999 Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Admin-
istrative Court Procedure (but amended several times since then). In both coun-
tries, these legislative reforms were introduced in the context of enhanced
transparency for public administration.
In Latin America, state liability tends to follow the European tradition,
namely the French generous principles although with some limited actual enforce-
ment.53 For example, the principle of sovereign immunity never really existed in
Brazil.54 The 1988 Constitution guarantees state liability (Article 37) reinforced by
the Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 (Article 43).55 There are important doctrines
concerning state liability resulting from influential case law.56 However, the appli-
cation of state liability has been tampered by the unwillingness of the state to fulfil
some of its obligations.57 Likewise, in Argentina and in Chile, case law has devel-
oped state liability (including liability imposed on the legislative and judicial
branches of government) but the application remains a practical issue. 58 State
liability is also explicitly mentioned in the Colombian 1991 Constitution (Article 90)
as well as by the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador (Article 11) and by the 1967
Constitution of Uruguay (Article 24). In the case of Mexico, state liability is
enshrined by the Constitution (Article 113) that was amended in 2000 to restrict
immunity and has been developed by the new Law of Federal Liability of Public
Servants enacted in 2002, as part of a reform for transparency and reduction of
corruption.59
2.2 Enforcement of State Liability
Many jurisdictions deal with state liability in administrative courts or other similarly
specialized courts. Administrative courts are typical of the so-called French family
of legal systems, although they are also present in the German family and in
common law countries.6 o The dualist approach to administrative law as opposed
to the resolution of conflicts between private parties of the French approach has
53 See ALBERTO B. BIANCHI, 'Panorama Actual de la Responsabilidad del Estado en el Derecho Compar-
ado', Revista Argentina Juridica La Ley (1992): 966 [in Spanish].
54 See CELSO ANTONio BANDEIRA DE MELLO, Curso de Direito Administrativo (Curitiba: Jurua, 2008) [in
Portuguese], 1015-1016.
ss Including liability for legislative acts. Ibid., 988.
56 Ibid., 1029 ff.
s7 Ibid, 1035 ff.
58 See, among others, EDUARDO MERTEHiKAN, La Responsabilidad Publica - Analigis de la Doctrina y
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema (Buenos Aires: E-book, 2006) [in Spanish].
5 See STEPHEN ZAMoRA Er AL., Mexican Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 318 ff.
60 They are characterized as an ineffective attribute of French law with respect to judicial review of
administrative decisions. See, for example, PAUL MAHONEY, 'The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might be Right', Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2001): 503, 512. For an excellent
historical overview of the American model, see ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, 'Specialized Adjudication',
BYULaw Review (1990): 377.
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resulted in a rigid division between public and private laws, since review of the
legality of administrative action by the ordinary judicial courts was originally
regarded as unacceptable. Historically, administrative review emerged as a mechan-
ism for higher levels of the administration to control lower levels of the adminis-
tration throughout the nineteenth century. The review bodies of the higher
administration have slowly become hybrid tribunals that are at the origin of the
current French-style administrative courts.61
Procedurally, in the civil law tradition, administrative courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over tort litigation against the state as sovereign, that is, disputes
concerning the exercise of state or public power. However, when the state acts as
a private entity then litigation can take place in regular courts as, for example, in
contractual litigation. Jurisdictional ambiguity as to the competent forum to bring
suit is likely to be problematic when the role of the state in the economy or in
society is more complex. Common examples include medical malpractice litigation
involving national health system medical doctors and accidents involving assets
(such as cars or buildings) belonging to state-owned enterprises. In fact, the multi-
ple roles played by the administration in the economy and in society make increas-
ingly more difficult to have precise definitions of state actions while exercising
public powers; for example, a car accident caused by a vehicle owned by a company
in which the state holds 25% of the shares.
2.3 Theories of State Liability
Immunities in state liability have long been the subject of an extensive legal
literature. Many scholars criticize immunities as undermining the rule of law,62
but other scholars have pointed out some economic advantages of these immunities.
First, they protect the public budget from public officials who lack incentives to
avoid misconduct and damages awards.63 Second, from the perspective of
61 A specialized review of judicial nature took place later in the nineteenth century, with the empow-
erment of the Consed d'tat in 1872, which was in essence an administrative body that evolved into
a semi-judicial or hybrid review type of court.
62 See, among others, MARK R. BROWN, 'Weathering Constitutional Change', University ofIllinois Law
Review 2000 (2000): 1091; ERwiN CHEMIRINSKY, 'Against Sovereign Immunity', Stanford Law
Review 53 (2001): 1201; Vicia C. JACKSON, 'Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity,
and Judicial Independence', George Washington International Law Review 35 (2003): 521; SuSAN
RANDAll, 'Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History', Nebraska Law Review 81 (2002): 1; DAVID
ZARING, 'Three Models of Constitutional Torts', Journal of Tort Law 2 (2008). In the English
context, see HARLOW, supra n. 21 (she argues that compensation for wrongdoings is a good general
principe of governance and taccountability; e sovereign immunity undermines gd mn
tration and reduces accountability). It has also been recently argued that state liability should be
limited not because of the nature of the defendant but rather in light of the functions performed,
implying that private entities performing the same functions could also be exempted; see MARK
ARONSON, 'Government Liability in Negligence', Melbourne University Law Review 32 (2008): 44.
63 See RODERICK M. HILLS, 'The Eleventh Amendment as a Curb on Bureaucratic Power', Stanford Law
Review 53 (2001): 1225.
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compensation to victims (the so-called corrective justice perspective on torts), it has
been noted that state liability, in terms of compensation to injured parties and legal
costs, is paid by taxpayers, not by the injurers. 64 Taxpayers have little control over
state expenses, therefore funding far in excess of the actual exposure to liability (a
rent-seeking argument). On top of that, we must consider deadweight losses from
taxation. Finally, some scholars find these immunities to be justified under the
separation of powers. On the one hand, state liability awards may undermine
judicial independence.6 5 On the other hand, the fear of liability may negatively
impact the tasks of the executive branch, by inducing the state to engage in
defensive tactics to avoid liability, thereby distracting resources, both in terms of
money and manpower, away from the central role of the executive, that is, the
provision of public services. 6 6
As to incentives for the behaviour of state officials, many scholars have pointed
out that the state's objective is not profit maximization, hence potentially lacking the
market discipline imposed on private injurers.6 7 In fact, it has been argued that the
use of an incentive mechanism for an agent - such as the threat of paying damages
when the risk from a given activity materializes in actual harm - depends crucially
on the objective function of the agent, in this case, on the motivation or goal one
assumes as the best fit for the behaviour of the state and its officials.6 8
Nevertheless, one could claim that, whatever model one uses to characterize
decisions and actions by public bodies, state liability imposes some political costs
upon the government, which may counter some of the forces working towards the
externalization of negative effects of government actions upon third parties.6 9 On
64 In contrast, some scholars have argued that taxpayers should be held responsible for state misbe-
haviour because they are the voters responsible for electing those who run the state. See BERNARD
P. DAUENHAUSER & MICHAEL L. WELLS, 'Corrective Justice and Constitutional Torts', Georgia Law
Review 35 (2001): 903.
65 See HAROLD J. KREr, 'Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity', Vanderbilt Law Review 45 (1992):
1529.
These latter dimensions have been mainly raised by English Courts in support of a parsimonious
and circumspect approach of the judicial branch to imposing liability upon state bodies.
A discussion of these themes is given in FAIRGRIEVE, supra n. 22, 64ff. and 129ff.
67 See DARYL J. LEVINSON, 'Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitu-
tional Costs', University of Chicago Law Review 67 (2000): 345. This article has attracted a lot of
discussion by providing a new framework to think about how state liability disciplines elected
officials.
68 MArrHEW L. SPITZER, 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort', Southern Cahfornia
Law Review 50 (1977): 515. This piece formally examines the desirability of an immunity rule for
different behavioural models: benevolent, egoist, and malevolent government.
69 KRAMER & SYKEs, supra n. 5 point out that even if politicians and public officials (as opposed to
shareholders of a private firm) do not have direct monetary incentives to externalize the accident
costs of the activities of the public organizations, given that they are not (lawfully at least) the
residual claimants of any surplus in the public budget, they have clear incentives for cost externa-
lization due to the political opportunity costs of public funds described below in the text. Moreover,
they underline several factors that may help (in the absence of state liability) the costly
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the one hand, it provides media attention to misconduct by state officials, hence
reducing their likelihood of re-election, as voters become more knowledgeable of
instances of misbehaviour. Liability may also interfere with the political agenda of
elected officials, by bringing into the focus of public attention - at least some of - its
harmful consequences.7 0 On the other hand, liability payments divert public funds
from other activities that are politically more profitable for the incumbent govern-
ment, in terms of public perception and voters' appeal, and channel them into
compensatory awards and legal costs, which hardly can be deemed as vote gainers.n
Therefore, one could argue that, at least potentially, state liability may create some
political incentives to prevent misconduct, and hence to monitor and punish state
officials for their misconduct.72 It is true, however, that this effect is subject to
timing distortions. Although depending on the time when losses are revealed, the
time of suit, and the length of litigation or settlement, the political cost of the
diversion of funds away from more visible and politically more appealing purposes
may be paid not by the elected official who took the decision ending in the tort
payment but by a later entrant into office.
Several agency problems, however, have been identified in the literature as
strong impediments to the effectiveness of the political incentive function of state
liability. Voters might have little ability to assess government performance with or
without state liability. Moreover, the political incentives that may be powerful at the
top echelons of government only affects a small number of public officials, namely
professional politicians and elected officials. Many cases of harm to private citizens
that could be redressed through state liability do not originate in the behaviour of
the elected officials, but on that of non-elected public agents, such as state employ-
ees and bureaucrats who are the subordinates of the elected officials. In addition,
elected officials might have little control over the actions of their subordinates in
terms of selection of personnel, promotion, operation, and so on. On top of this,
incentives created by state liability may be, in the margin, of little relevance,
because there are important political mechanisms that already provide exactly the
same incentives as state liability. When there is substantial political accountability,
externalization strategy of public officials hard to be perceived and to be uncovered by the citizenry:
Accidents may happen infrequently and are non-salient political issues, while voters will be ill-
informed about them, and their adverse consequences may disproportionately fall upon poorer
segments of the population who are relatively more politically disenfranchised. Although the large
variety of torts committed by public employees and officials may undermine the strength of some of
these factors in various sets of circumstances, it seems intuitive that in many areas of accidents
caused by state action, the cost externalization strategy may end up undetected and unpunished by
the voting ciizens. However, in most of th e, precisely the same factors would also lead to a not so
relevant role of legal liability of the state as a source of powerful political incentives for public
officials and politicians.
70 See POSNER & SYKES, supra n. 5.
71 These political opportunity costs of public funds used to pay out liabilities arising from torts
committed by public officials are also underlined by POSNER & SYKES, supra n. 5.
72 See ROSENTHAL, supra n. 15.
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it is likely to provide sufficient protection against misbehaviour by public officials,
and there is very little, if any, need for damages to achieve the optimal amount of
safety in public services and in the provision of public goods.7 3
Given this sceptical but, we believe, realistic attitude towards the effective
provision of incentives through legal liability in tort of the government, what seems
to emerge from the literature as possibly the sole virtue of state liability is that state
liability guarantees some form of compensation to victims. However, such an
objective could in many circumstances be achieved by publicly funded insurance
or other publicly organized compensation funds when private insurance fails.
Certainly, transaction costs will be reduced by substituting those cheaper alterna-
tives for expensive tort litigation. 74
These apparently bleak observations about the aptitude of state liability for
safety incentive provisions and satisfactory compensation of losses have led legal
scholars to explore and, eventually, to find other explanations apart from (costly)
compensation of injured parties and (weak) incentives for state officials. Some have
noted that state liability may be able to produce information and publicity about the
activity of state officials that could have an important and valuable effect on
assessing the performance of politicians and elected officials more generally. It
might also help the development of articulation between legal principles and rights
in cases where other types of legal intervention have largely failed.7 5 It is to be
noted, however, that media attention is likely to be only attracted by egregious
events and it is not clear whether it is the accident itself or the subsequent payment
of damages that generates information. Likewise, in this context, there are serious
arguments against settlement in state liability litigation.7 6 Moral hazard may be a
large problem here, since taxpayers would pay the bill of the settlement, but the
officials would enjoy the benefits of it; politicians want to minimize embarrassment
or electoral costs, so they are willing to settle more often and for higher amounts,
leading to many and excessive settlements.7 This outcome would undermine not
only the production of information but also the development of precedents.
7 On the ability of voters to discipline elected officials, see DONALD WirrmAN, The Myth ofDemocratic
Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
74 This is one of the points made by ROSENTHAL, supra n. 15. Obviously, state-provided insurance is
adequate if it is the cheapest available mechanism to society. However, the mere existence of profits
by private insurance companies does not make the state-provided insurance necessarily the cheapest
option.
7 See MYfuAm A. GILLES, 'In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitu-
tional Tort Remedies', Georgia Law Review 35 (2001): 845 and JAMES J. PARU, 'The Constitutional
Tort Action as Individual Remedy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 38 (2003):
393.
76 In fact, many European legal systems impose severe restrictions on settlement of claims (not only
state liability claims) involving the government. See further discussion in s. 4.2.
n See RODERICK M. HILLS, 'The Eleventh Amendment as a Curb on Bureaucratic Power', Stanford Law
Review 53 (2001): 1225.
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Finally, as discussed in the previous subsection, although differences between
common law and civil law jurisdictions are important in several respects, 8 these
systems have delivered similar results in many areas and legal scholars note that
state liability has been expanding at not so different paces in common law as well as
in civil law countries. The rationales for this development seem to be still unclear.
3. The Economics of State Liability
3. 1 State Liability to Provide Incentives
When state liability is expected to provide incentives to engage in accident-reducing
behaviour, we need to ask whether the imposition of liability on the state is likely to
result in incentives for state officials and agents at various levels. If it is so, the now
classical economic theory of tort liability offers guidance on how liability should be
determined and apportioned.7 9 However, if the chain of command fails to transmit
incentives from the liable organization to its decision-making employees in the
relevant context (high ranking in case of policy or far-reaching organizational
decisions, low level for many other kinds of precautionary behaviour), otherwise
optimal liability rules might fail to produce the desired outcome in terms of
incentives: first of all, the imposition of liability on the state might result in an
increase rather than a decrease in the number and/or severity of accidents; second,
to minimize these adverse effects, contributory negligence should generally be
preferred to simple or comparative negligence8 0 and strict liability with defence
of contributory negligence should be preferred to other forms of the strict liability
rule. Finally, if the chain of command fails, any form of state liability is likely to
result in a deterioration of the state budget but not necessarily in a reduction of the
accident-producing activity. We will prove these three statements in turn.8 '
If the chain of commandfails, state liability might result in an increase in the
number or severity of accidents. If the chain of command fails to transfer incentives,
a most obvious outcome is that state liability fails to reduce the number or the
severity of accidents. This happens in unilateral precaution accidents, when victims
cannot take any form of precaution to protect themselves from harm. Examples of
78 See for discussion J. DOYLE & J. REDWOOD, 'The Common Law Liability of Public Authorities:
The Interface between Public and Private Law', Tort Law Review 7 (1999): 30.
79 See, for a recent survey, STEVEN SHAVELL, 'Liability for Accidents', in Handbook of Law and
Economics, ed. A. MITCH POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL (Oxford: North-Holland, 2007).
s0 We refer here to the pure form of comparative negligence. Many jurisdictions employ a modified
form completely baring the victim from recovery if he or she is grossly at fault as, for example, when
the victim bears 50% or more of the t faul. Such correction makes comparative neigenc partialy
approximate contributory negligence but does not totally bridge the gap at low levels of negligence.
See, on the different versions of comparative negligence, from an economic perspective, MIREIA
ARTIGOT & FERNANDO GOMEZ, 'Contributory and Comparative Negligence', in Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics: Torts, ed. MICHAEL FAURE (Northampton, MA Edward Elgar, 2009).
81 Formal proofs for the first two claims are available from the authors; the third claim is proven
informally.
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these types of accidents, where the state is the only party that can take precaution,
are police shootings on passers-by and latent pollution by city waste.
In contrast, in bilateral precaution accidents, both the state and private
parties can take precaution in order to diminish the expected accident harm.
Examples of this are car accidents in badly kept roads, pedestrian accidents on
dangerous pavement, or harm to residents from severe weather conditions, when
warning or rescue by public bodies has failed, and also accidents in which the injury
falls upon a public employee (police or military personnel harmed by friendly fire,
for instance). In these cases, if victims observe or can expect that the state will not
take precaution, they might be induced to take less precaution when the state is
liable - as they will be compensated - than when the state is not liable - and hence
they would have to pay for their own losses. By insuring victims effectively and
gratuitously - this is an implicit insurance coverage ultimately paid for by
taxpayers - state liability might dilute the victims' incentives to take precaution
and hence might increase rather than reduce the number or severity of accidents.
To prove that state liability might worsen accident prevention and hence
social welfare, assume that a governmental body is liable under the simple negli-
gence rule8 2 for failure to maintain roads in a certain area. Assume further that
drivers can make up for lack of maintenance by taking some extra care on their part
and that this action would be socially desirable. Absent state liability, drivers would
have incentives to drive slowly. In contrast, with state liability, drivers expect the
state to be negligent and, according to the simple negligence rule, expect to receive
full compensation irrespective of their behaviour in case of accident. State's pre-
caution is the same with or without state liability, but drivers' precaution is less
with state liability, thus more accidents or more severe accidents occur. Finally,
note that a reduction in drivers' care brings about a reduction in social welfare. This
is because, by hypothesis, it would have been efficient that drivers increased their
precautions in response to the state's lack of precaution.
If the chain of command fails, contributory negligence is generally the desir-
able negligence rule. State liability might dilute victims' incentives, but this outcome
crucially depends on the liability rule in place. The reason why victims' incentives
are diluted in the example above is that the victim is insured against the accident
loss irrespective of his or her behaviour. Rules of simple negligence and strict
liability with dual contributory negligence guarantee the victim compensation
whenever the injurer is negligent and even if also the victim is negligent. It follows
that victim's incentives can be restored by making the victim bear as large as
possible a part of the accident loss when the injurer is negligent. Contributory
negligence and strict liability with defence of contributory negligence do so by
denying altogether compensation to negligent victims. This restores victims' incen-
tives and generally improves social welfare. Comparative negligence and strict
82 The victim receives no compensation unless the injurer (the state) is found negligent.
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liability with comparative negligence lie somewhere in between the two extreme
cases just described.8 3
As we have noticed above, when the state can be expected to take less than
socially optimal precaution, the level of precaution that victims should take is
typically different from the ideal level. In fact, victims might be called upon to
make up for the state's lack of precaution, as in the example above - a situation in
which the parties' precautions are substitute to each other - but it could be also
desirable that victims reduce their levels of precaution - a situation in which
parties' precautions are complements to each other - as their precaution becomes
less useful absent state's precaution, as it happens when the state fails to organize
and manage a reliable weather alert system and hence victim's effort to check
information provided by the system becomes useless. Therefore, it is generally
desirable that victims alter their precaution (either by increasing or by reducing
caretaking) in response to the state's lack of precaution.
A socially optimal negligence rule should take these considerations into
account and define the victims' negligence standard not with reference to the
theoretically optimal precaution level, but according to the level that is optimal
given the precaution actually taken by the state (a second best). Thus, the negli-
gence standard should be either higher or lower than the first-best level of precau-
tion, depending on whether precautions are substitutes or complements,
respectively. If the negligence standard is set in such a way, contributory negligence
guarantees that victims abide by such standard and hence minimizes the social cost
of accidents. The intuition behind this result is simple. Contributory negligence
makes the victim bear the full accident loss unless the victim takes the due level of
care. Such level of care is the most convenient choice for the victim as it minimizes
the accident loss given the actual behaviour of the state, and hence minimizes the
victim's liability costs. Other rules reduce the negligent victim's liability partially
(comparative negligence) or completely (simple negligence) and hence dilute the
incentives to abide by the due care standard.
In summary, we can manipulate the negligence standard under a contribu-
tory negligence rule in order to achieve the efficient precaution on the victim's side.
However, this is usually an expensive legal policy. Setting negligence standards in
such a way might be a cumbersome exercise, as it requires an accurate knowledge of
the behaviour of the state, which might not yet be known while setting negligence
standards. Moreover, setting the second-best negligence standard requires an
83 Anali , th e in whic the victim x ts i r to be negligent can. be treated as a
sequential case in which the victim moves second after observing that the injurer (the first mover) is
negligent. See DONALD A. WirrsN, 'Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance,
Mitigation of Damages and Related Doctrines in the Law', Journal of Legal Studies 10 (1981):
65; STEVEN SHAVELL, 'Tort in Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially', Journal ofLaw and Economics 26
(1983): 589; and MARK F. GRADY, 'Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and
the Farmer', Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1988): 15.
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implicit admission (and almost a justification) by one body of the state (a regulator
or a court) that another body of the state is performing suboptimally. In practice, it
might be easier to set negligence standards simply at the first-best level. In this case,
the superiority of contributory negligence still holds but is not absolute. To see why,
consider the case of complementary precaution, where victim's precaution should
be below the first-best level. That is, social welfare is maximized if the victim takes
less precaution than required by the negligence standard; in other words, it might
be desirable that the victim be negligent.
Under contributory negligence, the victim will either take the required
precaution (which is higher than the second-best level of precaution) or choose to
be negligent and take the second-best level of precaution. There might be cases in
which comparative negligence prevails over contributory negligence because it is
less costly for the victim to be negligent under comparative negligence than under
contributory negligence, and hence the victim will be negligent more often. How-
ever, this outcome is desirable only under some circumstances. In fact, under
comparative negligence, a negligent victim takes a level of precaution that is lower
than the second-best level of precaution, because the victim does not bear the full
accident loss. Thus, the choice is between possibly too high a level of precaution
under contributory negligence and too low a level of precaution under comparative
negligence. The balance could go either way. In all other cases, contributory
negligence performs better and hence seems to be the preferable rule.
Concluding, note that were the state to take optimal precaution all rules
would induce similar levels of victim's precaution, under perfect information and
no court error.84 Note also that strict liability with contributory negligence per-
forms as well (or as badly, with respect to the state incentives) in our setting as the
negligence with contributory negligence rule. The difference between the two only
concerns the residual bearer, that is, the party who bears the accident loss when
both are non-negligent. The choice between these two rules does not affect our
result in any way; moreover, if the state is expected to be negligent, it will not occur
in equilibrium that both parties are non-negligent.8 5
If the chain of commandfails, state liability might result in an aggravation of
the state budget but not necessarily in a reduction of the accident-producing activity.
The economic analysis of tort liability is based on a distinction between care and
activity level. Care encompasses all those precautionary measures that the court
uses in the determination of negligence. However, there are other measures that
affect the likelihood or the severity of accidents, which are not considered when
determining whether a party has been negligent. Those measures are referred to as
8 WILLIAM M. LANDES & BRicHARD A. POSNER, 'Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis', Journal of
Legal Studies 9 (1980): 517.
8s Wittman has shown that the marginal cost liability rule achieves higher levels of social welfare than
contributory negligence. This rule, however, is difficult to apply in its pure form as it requires
compensation of precaution costs even when an accident does not happen. See WrrumAN, supra n. 83.
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activity level.86 If the chain of command works, economic theory predicts that both
parties will take the due level of care and hence the residual accident costs will be
paid by the injurer if the rule in place is strict liability (with or without negligence
defences) or by the victim under a negligence rule. This ideal outcome is challenged
by a failure in the chain of command.
If the chain of command fails to channel incentives down to the responsible
individual, we are to expect the state to be found negligent most of the time in a
state liability claim. In turn, negligence by the victim is to be expected only when he
or she bears no or only a negligible portion of the accident costs - such as under
simple negligence or some forms of comparative negligence; otherwise, the victim
will find it advantageous to be non-negligent, leaving the state as the sole negligent
party. Thus, either both parties are negligent and the state bears most of the
accident costs, or only the state is negligent and the state bears all of the costs.
Note that this outcome results irrespective of whether the rule is strict liability or
negligence and, thus, due to the chain-of-command failure, liability rules cannot be
designed as to choose which party will be the residual bearer. To a large extent, the
state will bear the residual loss under all circumstances.
Analysts have noted that the party who bears the residual loss will have
incentives to control his or her level of activity.87 Thus, we should expect the state
to have such incentives. To give an example, accidents in public playgrounds can be
avoided by regularly maintaining child slides (care) or by refraining from installing
them in the first place (activity level). Let us assume that there is a chain-of-
command failure and hence the state official responsible for the maintenance of
the child slides does not act according to his duties even if the state is exposed to
tort liability - the state acts negligently by not supplying the required level of care.
Will the same official or another official in the administration respond to the
increased costs in liability payments by removing the child slides? That is, will the
state adjust its level of activity? Given the hypothesis (the chain-of-command fail-
ure), it seems difficult to imagine that this will happen. Most likely, the same
reasons that induce state officials to adopt a suboptimal level of care will prevent
them from choosing the desirable level of activity. This situation is likely to result in
an aggravation of the state budget and in the curbing of some state activities but not
necessarily in a reduction of the accident-producing activity in question.
3.2 State Liability to Remove Incentives
State liability is also invoked, more or less explicitly, for an opposite goal: that of
removing incentives. In the Introduction, we have discussed an example of corrup-
tion. Other examples include involuntary takings, customs and immigration laws,
86 See STEVEN SHAVELL, 'Strict Liability versus Negligence', Journal of Legal Studies 9 (1980): 1; and
GIUSEPPE DARI-MATTIACCI, 'On the Optimal Scope of Negligence', Review of Law and Economics 1
(2005): 331.
87 See SHAVELL, 1980, supra n. 86.
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taxes, and publicly conferred grants, such as patents or public subsidies, where
corruption could play a major role. Note, however, that the removal of incentives
we have in mind covers a broader set of cases than just bribing. For example, it has
been observed that wrongful conviction might generate incentives to engage in
illegal activities" because the possibility to be wrongfully sanctioned reduces the
relative advantages of engaging in legal activities. Moreover, wrongful conviction
might induce wasteful investments in litigation or in avoiding apprehension. Com-
pensation for wrongful conviction could remove or at least correct such incentives.
Similar considerations apply to misconduct concerning the protection of witnesses
(which might induce witnesses to avoid cooperation with enforcement authorities),
irregularities in the granting of patents (distorting R&D incentives and the use of
innovations), unlawful collection of evidence or other irregular police activities
(which induce bribing and avoidance behaviour), 9 or the exposure of people work-
ing with or for the state to risk (e.g., the Gulf War syndrome, 90 which could reduce
participation levels in such activities).
A different example is the case where sovereign immunity would allow
corporations to avoid product liability and shift responsibility from the corporation
to the state that cannot be sued (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry could use
approval by government to shield it against any responsibility). In this case, litiga-
tion by consumers would be impossible and therefore would have no deterrent effect
in products liability.
In our examples, the argument is that imposing a cost onto innocent citizens
(the wrongful denial of a permit by a corrupt official, the wrongful conviction
following a court error or undermining products liability) lowers the relative advan-
tage of engaging in legal activities, due to the fact that the legal activity may still
result in a (wrongful) disadvantage. Thus, legal activities are made comparatively less
desirable than illegal activities, something that distorts incentives to abide by the law.
To remedy this problem, innocents who have been unjustly denied a permit or
wrongfully convicted, for example, should be compensated, as to at least partially
remove the cost due to the wrongful state action and restore the correct incentives.91
In these and similar cases, liability is not only meant to provide the state with
incentives. The idea is that the behaviour of private parties may be realigned with
the socially desirable behaviour by compensating for losses. Absent compensation,
88 IvAN PAAK-LIANG PNG, 'Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error', Interna-
tional Review ofLaw and Economics 6 (1986): 101; and VINcY FoN & HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, 'State
Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on Crime Levels', Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 163 (2007): 269.
8 See, for example, DIANNE ROSKY, 'Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States' Liability for
the Intentional Torts of Federal Law Enforcement Officials', U. C Davis Law Review 36 (2004):
895.
90 On this point, see Winu~ B. LAFFERTY, 'The Persian Gulf War Syndrome: Rethinking State Tort
Liability', Stetson Law Review 25 (1995): 137.
9' See supra n. 88.
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private parties would react to these losses by altering their choices (corrupting the
official or engaging in criminal activities). This goal is carried out simply by
awarding compensation to the victim. As compared to the previous case, the
important analogy is that in these cases, incentives of private parties are affected
by state liability. In the case of accidents, the presence of liability might reduce the
incentive of private parties to take care. In this case, it is the absence of liability that
could distort incentives.
3.3 State Liability to Monitor Certain Public Bodies and
Branches of Government
State liability can be used to monitor certain public bodies or other branches of
government. This can happen when liability immunity is waived for tortious actions
by independent bodies such as regulatory agencies or when new legislation intro-
duces liability for wrong judicial decisions. These cases can be framed within the
general model describing the production and removal incentives (e.g., in order to
increase the quality of judicial decisions or reduce corruption and court conges-
tion). However, since policing the judiciary, independent regulatory agencies or
public bodies by means of state liability can be an effective way for the executive to
influence them, these examples raise other efficiency concerns.
The generation of information about performance is economically valuable;
however, it is far from clear that using state liability to generate that kind of
information is the least costly mechanism. Litigation and the tort liability system
are expensive devices to obtain information that presumably could be made avail-
able if public administration and state organization were improved. For example,
using state liability to gather information about the performance of courts or the
national health system does not seem to be cost effective.
Furthermore, invoking state liability to monitor certain public bodies or
other branches of government generates serious political economy concerns. State
liability can be used to disfavour other branches of government and independent
bodies, thus undermining the status quo checks and balances. One immediate
concern is the extent to which this legal development embodies rent-seeking by
the government, therefore increasing transaction costs. The argument that such
shift enhances accountability is also problematic, since state liability does not seem
to be the most cost effective way to do that. In fact, a comprehensive reform of the
institutional design of executive and judicial powers (e.g., a judicial council92)
seems more appropriate than the use of state liability. Although state liability is
likely to produce information that can be used by the upper levels of government in
order to assess the performance of lower levels, it seems to be a possibly very costly
9 See NuNo GAROUPA& TOM GiNSBURG, 'Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence', American Journal of Comparative Law 57 (2009): 103 and NUNo GAROUPA & TOM
GiNsBuR, 'The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils', Berkeley Journal ofInterna-
tional Law 27 (2009): 52.
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way to do so, somewhat similar to waiting for the Chernobyl nuclear power plant to
explode in order to gather information on the competence of its management.
3.4 Fixing the Problem
3.4. Making the Chain of Command Work
The problem with the provision of incentive resides in the failure of the chain of
command within the state apparatus. Evidently, if the state could effectively dele-
gate liability down the chain of command, the shortcomings identified in our
discussion would be solved. Apart from possible impediments to such a solution
already mentioned, delegating liability within the chain of command raises other
serious problems. Some of the objections follow easily from the economic literature
on vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, that is, the liability of firms for the mis-
conduct of their employees, is normally advocated as a correction for three possible
types of failures connected with the personal liability of the employee: (i) the
employee may be insolvent; (ii) the employee may be difficult to identify and
apprehend; (iii) the contract between employee and firm may fail to optimally
distribute risk.9 3 Imposing liability on the organization may solve those problems
as the firm is usually more solvent than individual employees, more readily identifi-
able and easier to sue, and a more efficient risk bearer.9 4 The question here is,
therefore, whether liability should be imposed on the firm or on the individuals and
not, as when discussing state liability, whether there should be liability at all.
Nevertheless, this literature offers some interesting conclusions that are applicable
in our case.
Under vicarious liability, the legal system essentially delegates the control of
the individual conduct of employees to the firm.95 As we have observed for state
liability, this mechanism works if incentives are transferred from the liable firm to
the employees whose behaviours affect the risk giving rise to vicarious liability. This
issue is taken into account both in legal doctrines and in economic analyses.
Legal doctrines of respondeat superior stress the point that the firm is liable
for acts committed by employees within the scope of the employment. This is to
ensure that liability is in fact imposed in situations in which the firm can exert
control over the employees' conduct and not otherwise.96 Legal economists97 have
recently pointed out that imposing liability for employees and not for independent
contractors discourages firms from asserting control over the conduct of their
9 See SYKES, supra n. 5; KORNHAUSER, supra n. 8; and GAROUPA, supra n. 8, for a comprehensive
discussion.
94 Imposing liability on the firm also avoids the problem of those firms that delegate dangerous tasks
to insolvent employees for the only purpose of escaping liability. See also KRAMER & SYKES, supra
n. 5, and ARLEN, supra n. 8, on perverse effects of vicarious liability.
9s See DAfU-MATriAcci & PARISI, supra n. 8.
96 See SYKES, supra n. 5, on this point.
97 See ARLEN & MAcLEOD supra n. 8.
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agents and, in fact, induces the structuring of the relationship as an independent
contract rather than as an employer-employee relationship. The core of this criti-
cism points to the normative implication that the scope of vicarious liability should
be defined as to include all those cases in which the firm factually has within its
choice the ability to control the conduct of its employees. Empirically, there seems
to be evidence suggesting that the threat of liability induces firms to strategically
disintegrate, create subsidiaries with limited liability, and make heavier use of
outside contractors, in order to reduce their liability burden.98 These sorts of
arguments and evidence, however, would apply only in a weaker form to state
liability, given that the use of subsidiaries is not available for the state, and even
the use of independent contractors may be limited for legal, and possibly also
political, constraints.
From the opposite perspective, it has been argued that when the firm cannot
control the conduct of its employees, individual liability is more efficient than
vicarious liability. Legal economists9 9 make this point in connection to white-collar
crimes and argue in favour of personal criminal liability when it is difficult for the
firm to monitor the behaviour of its employees. If individual state officials would be
frequently and effectively punished for harm arising from malfunctioning or failed
public services, some unintended and undesirable consequences may ensue.
The risk of liability would determine a decline of public administration relative
compensations, unless the state is willing to effectively increase salaries for the
employees suffering from the exposure to personal liability. This responsiveness in
the level of compensation seems unlikely to us, due to different factors: public
attention and public distrust of high levels of compensation of public officials
appear to be widespread; politicians, who would be the ones taking the decision
to increase compensation for the employees, would bear the political costs of the
measure but would not capture the entire value generated by the actions of public
employees, thus diluting the incentive to absorb the risk of individual liability
through higher compensation for the public employees. This deterioration of the
actual levels of compensation would create a problem of adverse selection in the
access to public employment, and thus lower the expected qualification of state
employees and the overall quality of the public administration.
Making public employees responsible may also produce incentives for defen-
sive behaviour in those exposed to liability. They would conduct the operation of
public services to maximize their expected personal utility, which would imply, to a
large extent, given the essentially output-independent level of compensation, mini-
mizing their expected total personal accident costs (personal costs of precaution,
9 A. RINGLEB & S. WicGNs, 'Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards', Journal of Political
Economy 98 (1990): 571.
A. MrrCHELL PouNsKY & SMVEN SHAVELL, 'Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment
Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?', International Review of Law and Economics 13
(1993): 239.
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typically modest, given that safety equipment is borne by the state, plus expected
personal liability) and not to maximize citizen's welfare. Risk aversion of individual
employees as agents (contrasting with the risk neutrality of society as a whole as the
principal, at least with respect to the ordinary risk of harm from public service)
would exacerbate this deviation from the optimal running of public services induced
by personal liability of public agents.
Summing up, the chain-of-command failure undermines the production of
adequate incentive and questions the deterrence effect of state liability. However,
there are serious practical impediments and substantive arguments to think that
achieving an effective chain of command is easily done. Our analysis suggests that,
if the function of state liability is to produce incentives, state liability should be a
function of the institutional design of state agencies. Paradoxically, however, this
may lead to the perverse outcome that better organized agencies - that is, agencies
with clearer and more responsive hierarchies - should be 'punished' by exposing
them to more liability than less organized agencies.
3.4.2 The Liability of State Employees
Having in mind the serious shortcomings identified in the previous sections, a
different approach is the overall substitution of state employees' liability for state
liability. 00 However, this alternative does not go without problems. We suggest at
least four serious shortcomings afflicting this proposal: (i) it imposes a cost on
victims in order to identify which state officials were negligent or caused the
accident (which, given the complexity of modern states, in some cases will be quite
costly, if possible at all);10' (ii) since in many situations the observed output of state
activity is the product of a team, we would have the usual problem of punishing only
some members of a team (those who are perceived to be at fault by the victim and by
the court) with the result of well-known distortions in behaviour within the relevant
team; (iii) insolvency by state officials; (iv) potential adverse selection problems
across state departments, since not all state jobs are equally exposed to liability as
perceived by victims or the need to compensate state officials for the larger expo-
sure to liability due to their functions. We should realize that punishing elected
officials for the behaviour of state officials (only a minority of which are directly
appointed by the elected officials) will introduce yet another agency problem that
would further develop cover-ups and liability avoidance activities as discussed
before.
Moreover, given the high fixed cost component of litigation, tort, or other-
wise, the disaggregated character of separate lawsuits against individual public
employees would add on the costs of bringing more aggregated tort claims against
100 See KRAMER & SYKES, supra n. 5, for an examination of the choice between personal liability and
vicarious liability.
10' See supra n. 5 and n. 8.
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the state based on state liability principles. When liability insurance was used to
shift risks away from the potentially liable party (even if paid by the state, and not by
the individual employee, as is the rule in private firms with managers with respect
to Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance), the costs of handling a much
larger number of individual insurance policies would also be higher than a global
policy for the relevant public body (the city, statutory corporation, government,
and so on).
In conclusion, personal liability imposed on state employees is an obvious
solution to the shortcoming identified in the previous subsections; that is, it could
theoretically provide the missing incentives for avoiding accidental or wilful mis-
conduct, as well as making sure that victims and innocent citizens are compensated.
There are, however, several arguments that may justify why, in practice, this
instrument is unlikely to provide an adequate solution to risks arising from public
actions, and hence justify resorting to state liability (albeit its second-best nature).
3.4.3 Market Pressure
A further particular case of actions that deserve attention is the ones involving state
provision of private goods. The distinction between torts committed by the state
while providing public goods or while regulating markets and those committed by
the state while providing private goods in competition with private entities (subject
to tort liability) is important. Sovereign immunity extending to the state provision
of private goods gives an advantage to the state over private companies. Conse-
quently, the liability immunity in actions that are not exclusive competences of the
state can distort the market for those private goods and services in a significant way.
A similar reasoning applies to the state provision of private goods in a
monopolistic market. Absent any market discipline as well as any form of tort
liability, there will be disproportionate losses to taxpayers (who could be expro-
priated of the monopoly rents by the politically appointed management) and for
consumers (who bear the cost of monopoly power).
The analogy between state and corporate liability is stronger for those
activities that can be provided concurrently by states and private corporations. An
economic analysis suggests that a sharp distinction should be made between activ-
ities that are exclusively provided by the state (which should be framed in the
general model we have developed) and those that are concurrently provided by
the state (for which the economic analysis of corporate liability should be the
appropriate model given the market context).
4. Specialized Courts and Procedures for State Liability
If state liability is to exist, then it has to be enforced. As usual, the enforcement
must be provided by courts (by court awards) or in the shadow of the courts (by out-
of-court settlements). A natural question is if state liability should be in the realm of
specialized courts given that the state is a very particular type of defendant, and
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state liability over tortious acts committed by the administration might be very
distinct from other torts and wrongdoings as we have discussed previously. Estab-
lishing specialized courts raises important issues, namely the extent to which state
liability should be enforced by courts with a specialized jurisdiction for adminis-
trative matters, the degree of specialization exhibited by the judges staffing those
courts, and the particularities of a specialized set of procedural rules distinct in
nature from civil and criminal procedures. In many countries, state liability is under
the jurisdiction of administrative courts with specialized judges and operating under
their own procedural rules. In other countries, state liability is litigated in regular
courts under standard rules of civil procedure. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the
state is not allowed to engage in out-of-court settlements (or at least faces very
serious limitations). This characteristic increases transaction costs for state liability
and makes it quite different from civil and criminal cases. Certainly, the variance of
experiences across countries permits a useful analysis of the advantages and dis-
advantages of using specialized jurisdiction for state liability, although as we have
noticed the practical results do not seem to be extremely dissimilar.
4. 1 Specialized Courts for State Liability
Given the focus of this article, our analysis concentrates on the use of specialized
courts for state liability, but the relevance of the topic hinges upon the controversial
relationship between courts and administrative lawmaking. 102 Separation between
regular and administrative courts encourages specialization in state liability and in
administrative matters more generally. Hence, better training, better particularized
information, tailored procedures in court to deal with the special features of the
defendant (the state), better technology in evidence production, and so on is
possible when judges have the training and the incentives to become specialists in
administrative law. On the other hand, separation makes capture by the state or by
special interests easier. As usual, specialization makes accountability more difficult,
as knowledge of administrative law becomes a specific asset in human capital for the
judges and therefore they are more dependent on (or more easily constrained by)
the government (state officials) as in the typical hold-up problem, and the marginal
cost for the judge of deciding against the state is much higher in administrative than
in ordinary judicial courts. If specialization is more important than capture, that is,
the benefits from specialization outweigh the costs of capture, then administrative
courts should exist for purposes of enforcing state liability.
102 See, among others, RicHARD POSNER, 'Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function', Southern California Law Review
56 (1983): 761; RICHARD L. REVESZ, 'Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System',
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 38 (1989): 1111; ROCHELLE C. DREYFuss, 'The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts', NYU Law Review 64 (1989): 1; DREYFUSS, 1990,
supra n. 60; NiCHOLAs BACLEY & RicHARD L. REVEsz, 'Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State',
Columbia Law Review (2006).
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Understanding the exact nature of the benefits and costs of court specializa-
tion is therefore of the outmost importance. We start by specifying these benefits
and costs as widely discussed in the literature and assess the extent to which they are
relevant for state liability. Table 1 summarizes the arguments in favour and against
specialization.
A specialized court could assure correct and legally coherent decisions in a
complex area given the difficulties in establishing state liability and the technical
nature of the underlying facts. Obviously, this argument only makes sense if indeed
the determination of state liability is substantively different from tort liability. It
could be argued, though, that at least a fraction of state liability cases (for instance,
accidents caused by school buses or police cars, both owned by the state) share a
substantial portion of legal issues with ordinary tort cases (causation, proximate
causation, determination of fault, estimation of harm), thus decreasing the benefits
of specialized courts in administrative law to deal with these cases. It is true, never-
theless, that other cases share fewer issues with ordinary tort cases among private
individuals or firms (illegal denial of permits or licenses). Therefore, the critical issue
Table 1. Costs and Benefits of Specialized Courts
Advantages Disadvantages
Higher quality of decisions Administrative costs of running a new network
(in content and in timing) of courts
Legal coherence Capture by specialized interests (including a
specialized bar)
Uniformity of judicial decisions Costs of coordination with regular courts
(include losses to incoherence between different
areas of the law and procedure)
Reduction of regular courts' Development of vested interests by specialized
workload judges and court services or the creation of new
state agencies
Costs of appeal from specialized courts to
non-specialized appeal courts (depending on
the locus of specialization)
Costs of less geographical proximity of courts to
populations (since specialized courts are usually
located in large cities)
Source: NuNo GAROUPA, NATALIA JORGENSEN & PABLO VAZQUEZ, 'Assessing the Argument for Specialized
Courts: Evidence from Family Courts in Spain', International Journal of Law, Policy and the
Family 24 (2010): 54.
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is not the complexity of state liability but the extent to which such complexity is
intrinsic to determining liability when the state is the defendant. This argument does
not seem to us to be overwhelming. In fact, state liability for state provision of private
goods does not seem to satisfy the argument for a specialized jurisdiction.
A different advantage refers to uniformity of judicial decisions, usually
echoed in the American legal system with the objective of producing a uniform
interpretation of federal administrative law, absent inter-circuit stare decisis. It is
plausible that uniformity over state liability is more important than over tort
liability because of the federal implications of adjudicating state liability, not least
in terms of the costs to the federal budget.
Court workload is another argument, in particular when we have court
congestion with an increased volume of litigation and a potential reduction in
quality in sentencing as a response. In other words, the need to keep high-quality
generalist courts might justify transferring jurisdiction of state liability to specia-
lized courts. In fact, one should notice that by alleviating the dockets of regular
courts, one expects to increase the general understanding of the law (due to fewer
people writing about the same law) that generates less litigation and less workload
in the future. The natural question here is why state liability, or any other admin-
istrative matter, and not other relevant areas of the law. The answer seems to be that
what should be transferred are cases characterized by a high volume of routine cases
with significant workload for regular courts, which is untrue in many countries
when it comes to state liability. However, this argument has serious empirical
deficiencies since state liability litigation does not seem to be overburdening the
court system.
On top of pure efficiency considerations of specialization, there are political
economy arguments. The standard justification is that state liability cannot be
adjudicated by administrative bodies due to their lack of impartiality since they
combine rulemaking, adjudication and enforcement functions. The creation of
specialized courts to deal with state liability could be part of a broader course of
action that effectively reverses the process of delegation of authority to adminis-
trative agencies (since it reallocates some of their competences to the benefit of the
courts). Yet, it is not obvious why specialized courts would be willing to confront
the administration more frequently than regular courts (in fact, if we believe in the
capture hypothesis, they might be less willing to do so). In other words, it could be
that specialized courts are more willing to impose state liability than administrative
agencies, but the relevant comparison should be between specialized and generalist
courts. Furthermore, if specialized courts are to be used as a mechanism to limit
administrative authority, it can always generate a backlash in terms of future
delegation or new legislation. Another line of reasoning is to argue that specialized
courts, by limiting and supervising agencies, reduce the need for further adminis-
tration supervision and therefore provide a good signal of which areas of the
administration are more prone to generate state liability. Yet, as we have seen in
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the previous section, such a conclusion presupposes that incentives within the
administration are fairly aligned (i.e., that the upper levels of the administration
are interested in determining state liability from wrongdoings by lower levels of the
administration), and hence courts are more effective in sanctioning negligent
bureaucrats than the administration itself. As to the signal sent to the general
public, although presumably important, it would probably be stronger coming from
a generalist court, given that the state there enjoys exactly the same privileges as
any other private party.
Capture is the standard argument against specialization. It can take place at
the appointment level. Examples include dependence of a specialized bar or of a
specialized judicial council and other devices by which the interests of the admin-
istration can make its influence felt in the appointment mechanism. Capture can
also take place at the level of the adjudication.10 3 There are very strong arguments
to consider capture of specialized courts a major issue.' 04 The costs of capturing are
lower given the specificity of the issues at stake and the relatively low chances of
being exposed. On the other hand, the perspective of specialized judges forming a
cohesive group, fairly insulated from other magistrates and less likely to be accoun-
table, increases potential benefits. Finally, in the case of state liability we might
suspect important structural biases. Indeed, the influence of the administration and
of special interests will tend to align the profile of the state bureaucracy with that of
the specialized bench (favouring, e.g., the administration in producing evidence or
raising the costs for private parties to show lack of due care by the administration).
We could say that many of the particularities of administrative procedure observed
in many jurisdictions are in part consequences of this alignment.
There is also the possibility of internal capture or the development of vested
interests. Courts could behave strategically as any other bureaucracy and push for
expansion of budget and resources, attract new business to justify their existence, or
develop confusing and incoherent procedure (discovery, pleading, or trial methods)
that make cross-relationships unproductive (therefore keeping the monopoly of
specialized courts over a particular subject matter, in this case, state liability).
A potential ratchet effect should not be neglected. Specialized courts push for
idiosyncratic procedures, a specialized bar and hence a particular market for legal
services. Thus, we might be creating a completely different legal environment for
state liability.
103 See discussion of illustrative empirical evidence, supra n. 39.
104 For instance, it has been considered one of the critical factors explaining the expansion of patent
rights in the United States, after the creation in 1982 of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, concentrating jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office, and also
from federal district courts in patent infringement cases. See DREYFUSS, 1990, supra n. 60; WILuAM
M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), Ch. 12; ADAi B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, Innovation and Its
Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress and What to
Do About It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), Ch. 4.
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Finally, the highly significant influence of specialized courts on administra-
tive law and administrative procedure in determining state liability reduces effective
supervision by higher regular or generalist courts. Not least, such ineffective
supervision increases the possibility of mistakes that will increase the need for
new legislation.
Many of the benefits and costs are exacerbated if state liability is assigned to
specialized courts on the basis of exclusivity (administrative courts hear every case
of state liability) and limitation (administrative courts hear only cases of an admin-
istrative nature).' 0 5 Similarly, if specialized courts are staffed with specialized
judges rather than generalist judges. Obviously, increased collegiality of the specia-
lized judiciary promotes faster learning in specific areas of the law but generates two
important drawbacks. First, a specialized bench might not enjoy the reputation of a
generalist judiciary and hence an adverse selection effect might take place (it could
be harder for administrative courts to attract talent). Second, a specialized bench
might have to interact with higher courts staffed with generalist judges (depending
on the locus of specialization; some countries have a specialized bench at all levels
of the judiciary). This hierarchical relationship might create serious conflicts, not
least because the use of particular procedures in specialized courts (i.e., procedures
that are modified for specific goals) might disturb the whole court system.
In our view, this striking difference between a specialized court system for
state liability and administrative law of the French type and less so for common law
does not necessarily mean that one arrangement is superior to the other. We argue
that there are certain characteristics of the French system that might justify its
design for certain jurisdictions.
General complexity of administrative law. One should look not only at over-
all complexity but also at variance within administrative law: the higher the variance
in the legal issues among different types of administrative law cases (state liability
versus review of agency regulations, tax law, environmental law, or public employ-
ment rules), the less the benefits of specialization for each sub-field of adminis-
trative law, including state liability. It has been recognized that French-style
administrative law is extremely complex and varies across substantive areas (such
as taxes, licensing, and regulation and public employment, for example). 0 6 To this
legal complexity, one needs to add the assessment of state actions that are market-
oriented in economic nature but of legal public nature (public provision of public
goods and services).
105 See discussion of terminology by REVEsz, supra n. 102.
106 See BEU. Ir AL., supra n. 24. For Italian law, see WATKIN, supra n. 35, recognizing special areas of
administrative law (tax, pensions and public waterways). For German law, see NIERHAUS, supra n. 40,
explaining that administrative law is highly specialized and usually defined according to the
different branches of the administration such as public construction and zoning law, civil service,
local administration, or environmental administrative law.
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Strong state intervention in the economy and in society. A large size of the
public sector naturally increases the complexity of administrative law and also the
likelihood of more litigation between private victims and the state. It also makes
the distinction between state regulatory actions and those of a private nature more
relevant.
Strongly unionized and substantial public employment. It is likely that there
will be important conflicts between the unionized public workers and the state (as
an employer) when state liability becomes more effective.
A weak system of independent regulatory agencies and a strong system of
administrative-dependent agencies. Independent regulatory agencies play an impor-
tant role in providing expertise on administrative law and state liability in their own
fields of regulation; they also provide informal review of administrative justice.
The judiciary would be, in general, less distrustful (in the political view of the
judiciary as a check against the excesses of a partisan executive branch) of an
independent agency than of purely political decisions of an administrative agency.
Hence, where we find strong and independent expert agencies we expect less need
for specialized administrative courts; they are, to some degree, substitutes, both in
expertise in administrative law and in political independence from the executive. 107
Note that our conclusion looks at independent regulatory agencies and specialized
courts as providers of high-quality reviews of administrative decisions. A different
viewpoint refers to accountability where the appeal process plays an important role
in keeping independent regulatory agencies constrained.
4.2 Out-of-Court Settlements with the State
Of particular importance are rules governing out-of-court settlements.
The arguments against out-of-court settlements for state liability litigation are that
the value of the information provided by litigation for assessing the performance of
the government and elected officials will be lost and the willingness of officials to pay
too much for settling (avoiding disclosure to the general public). Even more impor-
tantly, if we take the principal-agent model, settlement could be reached without the
principal knowing about the occurrence of the wrongdoing as well as the facts and the
amount of the settled compensation, something quite unlikely in corporate organiza-
tions; for the shareholders to be kept ignorant of a non-trivial settlement involving
ultimately managerial action, one would need to cook the books to hide the facts and
the amount of the settlement, an action that is in itself both a tort and a crime.
Both arguments, however, need some careful thinking. Information provided
by litigation is only politically relevant when the media takes notice of it; otherwise,
taxpayers and voters would hardly pay any attention to it. The question is whether
107 See discussion by JEAN-MICHEL JOSSELIN & AIAIN MARcIANO, 'The Paradox of Leviathan: How to
Develop and Contain the Future European State?', European Journal of Law and Economics 4
(1997): 5 (emphasizing the advantages of French type of administrative law to restrain the state).
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the media pursues the wrongdoing itself or only notices once the consequent
litigation takes place. Media attention to wrongdoings could pressure elected offi-
cials to avoid out-of-court settlements if they are perceived as a signal of misman-
agement. Furthermore, there is no obvious interest for plaintiffs to avoid media
attention since it might increase their bargaining position. As to the argument that
officials are willing to pay too much, this is surely constrained, at least to some
extent, by the need to increase taxation to raise the necessary amounts, and by
governmental budgetary and accountability rules.
State liability generates information about the quality of state actions.
The more often damages are paid by the state, the more information about the quality
of state actions is provided to the voters. Obviously, the interests of the voters and
those of taxpayers are not fully aligned, but at least to some extent political elections
provide for the possibility to send signals to politicians showing discontent concerning
the behaviour of state officials. In corporate liability, there are two agency problems
to be solved, between shareholders and agents, on one hand, and between the
authorities and the corporate owners, on the other hand. Therefore, the shareholders
are at the same time agents of the state - as embodying, at least ideally, social welfare -
and principals for corporate managers. In state liability, there is one principal
(taxpayers) and one agent (the state official). Hence, the information revelation
problem is of a different nature in corporate liability than in state liability. Whereas
in corporate liability, information revealed by adjudication is not a good alternative to
information revealed by internal control mechanisms in the corporation (which share-
holders as an agent of the state also may want to hide); in state liability, information
revealed by adjudication may be the only reliable one that taxpayers observe. 108
State liability could provide a focal point for the rest of the society. Many
citizens are unsure about the appropriate behaviour and state liability provides
them with a focal point to answer that question. The impunity of the state as a
major player in modern economies would undermine societal trust in the rule of law
and in the desirability of adjusting behaviour to legal rules. Such arguments are
similar to those that argue for liability, in particular, corporate liability, as a
framework to manage or mould social and individual preferences. There are reasons
to suspect that this goal is more efficiently achieved by other means, educational in
particular. Furthermore, empirically it has to be shown that state immunity actually
undermines individual liability perceptions.
108 Furthermore, in the corporate context, to alleviate the agency problem between the government and
the shareholders, there are gatekeepers - mainly auditors. In the public sector, there may be surrogates
of this: Ombudsmen, independent public auditors (courts of auditing such as the Spanish Tribunal de
Cuentas or the Italian Corte dei conti), and so forth. Although see LoaENz BLUME & STEFAN VoicT,
'Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous, A Cross Country Assessment', SSRN Working
Paper, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=965434>, March 2007.
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5. Conclusions
We have discussed three main functions of state liability, namely to produce incen-
tives to optimally deter wrongdoings, to remove incentives for inefficient behaviour
by third parties, and to monitor certain public bodies or other branches of govern-
ment. With respect to the first argument, we have contended that the optimal design
of state liability is a function of the ability of the state to control and efficiently
delegate decision-making powers within the bureaucracy. This raises questions con-
cerning risk sharing, employment contracting in state jobs, and information asym-
metries with respect to the functioning of state administration. We have also added
potential focal point gains, of which, nevertheless, we remain more than doubtful. As
to the second function, we have observed that, contrary to state liability to produce
incentives, state liability to remove incentives is independent of the ability of the state
to control behaviour and its optimal design does not involve notions of responsibility.
Quite the opposite, state liability to remove incentives only makes sense if cheaper
private or public alternatives are not available. We can identify a range of situations
where market-oriented solutions are potentially ineffective, but even when the system
is to be publicly funded, it can be structured as a compensation fund rather than being
managed through the tort liability system. Finally, as to the third function, we
recognize that state liability can play an important role in generating information
about performance of public bodies, but it does not seem to us that this is usually the
cheapest device available to the central government.
A very important point we make in the article is that not only might state
liability not be a social welfare enhancing institution but it could be counterpro-
ductive, precisely for the reasons that policy makers tend to use to support the
expansion of state liability. Compensating victims of state wrongdoings might
generate moral hazard in an environment where the injurer is not incentivized to
exert precaution; hence, the outcome might be more accidents, more litigation and
more state expenditures (to be borne by taxpayers via distortionary taxation).
The point we make is not that state liability is in itself a bad idea, as many
scholars have suggested, but rather that state liability is an integral part of the
broader design of public institutions. The challenge for states should be to develop
state liability within the conditions we have identified in this article. In fact, these
are not exogenous conditions; states can shape the adequate institutions to meet the
conditions we have described.
At the same time, we have identified circumstances under which state
liability should be adjudicated in specialized courts with specific procedural rules.
A very critical observation is that from the mere existence of a specialized adjudica-
tion system for state liability we cannot infer the efficiency or inefficiency of a
specific legal regime. Certain factors, namely general complexity of administrative
law, strong state intervention in the economy and in society, strong and relevant
public employment, and weak independent regulatory agencies might justify a
system of specialized judicial review for state liability.
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